UIA v Dishman – 19.08

UIA v Dishman
Digest no. 19.08

Cite as: UIA v Dishman, Unpublished Opinion of the St. Clair County Circuit Court, Issued March 21, 2006 (Docket No. K-05-229-AE).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Carolyn Dishman
Employer: TI Automotive Group
Docket no.: 05-002295-AE
Date of decision: March 21, 2006

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HOLDING: Board of Review’s finding on rehearing that Claimant was eligible for TRA unemployment benefits under 19 USC § 2291(a)(5)(C) because she obtained a waiver after the date on which Claimant separated from Employer was not contrary to law, and was supported by substantial and material evidence on the record.

FACTS: Claimant’s employment with TI Automotive Group ended on April 29, 2004. Consequently, Claimant later sought TRA benefits. While pursuing TRA benefits, Claimant received a “Waiver of TAA Training Requirement” on November 5, 2004. The Board of Review found that Claimant was entitled to TRA payments under 19 USC § 2291(a)(5)(C).

The appellant argues that Claimant should be denied payments because of her failure to obtain a waiver within the time limits described in 19 USC § 2291(a)(5)(A)(ii)(I)-(IV). Appellant bases argument exclusively on the U.S. Department of Labor letter, “Training and Employment Guidance Letter No. 11-02,”(TEGL) which gives an agency interpretation of 19 USC § 2291(a)(5)(A).

DECISION: The court affirmed the Board of Review’s finding that Claimant is entitled to TRA payments because she obtained a waiver after the date on which claimant separated from employer, 19 USC § 2291(a)(5)(C).

RATIONALE: The Court rejected the Agency’s argument. First, the Agency’s argument rested on the argument that the Department of Labor letter applied to Claimant’s particular case. The court rejected this as an interpretation which ignored the fact that the letter only interpreted subsection (5)(A) and not subsection (5)(C), for which the claimant based their request for waiver. Second, the court, assuming that the Department of Labor letter did apply, still would not change the court’s decision to affirm the Board of Review’s ruling, since the Appellant raised no grounds from which the letter should be given any special deference. See e.g. Chevron v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837 (1984). Further, the court found that the letter’s intent was contrary to that of Congress when it initially implemented the TRA legislation, asTRA legislation subsections (5)(A)-(C) create three options from which a worker is eligible for TRA benefits, and Claimant’s failure to obtain a waiver within the time limits set forth in the statute does not foreclose her ability to receive benefits under another option.

Digest Author: A. Kaled
Digest Updated: 7.27.11