Winfied Machine Service LLC v. UIA – 14.19

Winfied Machine Service LLC v. UIA
Digest No. 14.19

Section 429.21(1)(i)

Cite as: Winfied Machine Services, LLC v Havens, unpublished opinion of the Macomb Circuit Court, issued July 13, 2009 (Docket No. 2009-­0342-­AE).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Dennis Havens
Employer: Winfied Machine Services LLC
Date of decision: July 13, 2009

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HOLDING: Because the Michigan Employment Security Act does not define “theft” for the purposes of MCL 429.21(1)(i), a claimant cannot be disqualified from receiving benefits when “theft” is interpreted as requiring felonious intent and the employer fails to establish that the claimant acted with felonious intent.

FACTS: Claimant was fired after his employer discovered that he had sold a hydraulic pump allegedly stolen from the employer. Testimony on behalf of the Claimant suggested that a third party had given Claimant the pump, and that Claimant was unaware of any prior owners.  Neither the ALJ nor the Michigan Employment Security Board of Review could determine true ownership of the pump. Since ownership of the pump was unclear, the Board found that the employer failed to meet its burden of demonstrating Claimant’s felonious intent to deprive the employer of its alleged property.

DECISION: The court declined to reverse the decision of the Michigan Employment Security Board of Review because it was supported by “competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record, and clearly conformed to the law.”

RATIONALE: Because the Michigan Employment Security Act does not define “theft,” it is not contrary to the law to determine that an element of theft is felonious intent.  Under such an interpretation, a claimant cannot be disqualified from receiving benefits under MCL 429.21(1)(i) when the Employer fails to establish felonious intent.

Digest author: James Mestichelli, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest updated: 3/29/2016

MESC v NL Industries (USA), Inc – 2.09

MESC v NL Industries (USA), Inc
Digest no. 2.09

Sections 21, 32a

Cite asMESC v NL Industries (USA), Inc, unpublished opinion of the Oakland County Circuit Court, issued January 5, 1994 (Docket No. 93-459745-AE).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: N/A
Employer: NL Industries (USA), Inc.
Docket no.: L90-10851-2103
Date of decision: January 5, 1994

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CIRCUIT COURT HOLDING: Where the MESC fails to issue rate determinations and, instead assigns temporary rates by means of quarterly contribution reports, for a period of years, those so-called temporary rates become final if the employer is not notified of a contribution rate within six months of the computation date (June 30).

FACTS: In 1985, MESC issued determination of successorship. No rate determination was issued, but employer’s quarterly contribution reports showed rate of 2.7%. Sometimes a “T” appeared before the rate. Employer paid the 2.7% rate until October 27, 1989, at which time the MESC issued rate determinations covering 1985-89 of 9.1%, 8.7%, 7.8%, 7.3% and 6.6%. MESC’s position was that the quarterly reports were not rate determinations and not subject to the finality provisions of Section 32a(2). Further, the statute and Administrative Rules do not provide for temporary rates and therefore, the rates shown on the quarterly contribution statements could not become final rates under Section 21(a).

DECISION: Decision of MES Board of Review affirmed. (Later MESC appeal to Court of Appeals withdrawn.)

RATIONALE: Under Section 21(a), employers are entitled to notification of contribution rate no later than six months after the computation date. This notification is mandatory, not discretionary. The computation date under Section 18(a) is June 30 of each year. Therefore, employers must be notified of rate by December 31 of each year. Otherwise the finality provisions of Section 32a(2) apply. A statement of a rate such as that on the quarterly contribution report is a “statement” of a rate determination pursuant to Section 21(a).

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated: 7/99

Trumble’s Rent-L-Center, Inc v MESC – 2.18

Trumble’s Rent-L-Center v MESC
Digest no. 2.18

Sections 18(d), 21

Cite as: Trumble’s Rent-L-Center v MESC, 197 Mich App 229 (1992).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: N/A
Employer: Trumble’s Rent-L-Center, Inc.
Docket no.: L88-14843-1985
Date of decision: December 7, 1992

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COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING: Where employer submitted a missing quarterly report more than 30 days after the issuance of a rate determination, mere submission of the report did not amount to a request for an extension of time under Section 21(a).

FACTS: Employer failed to file a quarterly report for quarter ending September 30, 1985. MESC issued Notice of Contribution Rate on March 23, 1987 assessing 10% rate because of the missing report. The notice stated that if the missing report was provided within 30 days, the rate would be recomputed. The notice further stated that the rate determination would be final if not appealed within thirty days and that an additional thirty days would be granted upon written request. The employer filed the missing report on May 5, 1987-more than thirty days after mailing of the March 23, 1987 Notice. The employer contends that sending the report operated as a request for redetermination as it was submitted within the allowable extension period.

DECISION: The March 23, 1987 rate determination became final thirty days after it was mailed.

RATIONALE: Words or phrases in the statute are accorded their plain and ordinary meaning, unless otherwise defined. Filing a report is not equivalent to mailing a written request. Therefore, it cannot be found that a request for an extension of time was made. “The burden is not on the agency to discern the intent of its correspondents.”

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated: 7/99