White v. Meritain Health, Inc. – 10.123

White v. Meritain Health, Inc.
Digest No. 10.123

Section 421.29

Cite as: White v Meritain Health, Inc, unpublished opinion of the Ingham County Circuit Court, issued July 17, 2015 (Case No. 14-1432-AA).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Amy White
Employer: Meritain Health, Inc.
Date of decision: July 17, 2015

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HOLDING: Whether a claimant voluntarily quit his/her job is a two-pronged analysis according to MCL 421.29(1)(a). The test was further clarified by the Michigan Supreme Court in Warren v Caro Community Hospital, 457 Mich 361 (1998). The ALJ failed to apply the two-pronged voluntary leaving test in this case.

FACTS: Claimant felt threatened by her ex-husband, who had a history of abusive behavior towards her. Claimant obtained a Personal Protection Order against her ex-husband and took steps to hide her home and work addresses from him. Claimant’s ex-husband showed up at her work (Meritain Health) one day and parked at a neighboring lot. Claimant felt threatened and informed her direct supervisor, who did not offer any help but told Claimant that she “needed to deal with her personal issues on her own time.” The employer’s protocol prevented Claimant from bringing the issue to any other supervisor. Claimant’s ex-husband returned to the parking lot next to her job a second time. Having no supervisor to turn to, Claimant submitted her two weeks’ notice of quitting because she did not feel safe on the premises anymore.

DECISION: The ALJ acted contrary to law when he failed to address whether Claimant’s separation from her job was voluntary. The case was remanded to the ALJ to apply the Warren v. Caro Community Hospital test and find whether the Claimant’s employment separation was voluntary.

RATIONALE: The Court reasoned that MCL 421.29(1)(a) clearly states there are two factors to analyze: (1) whether an individual left work voluntarily and, if so, (2) whether the voluntary leaving was with good cause attributable to the employer. Thus, the Court found the ALJ did err when he failed to conclude whether Claimant’s separation from her job was voluntary.

The term “voluntary” in this context “connotes a choice between alternatives which ordinary persons would find reasonable. Clark v North Detroit General Hospital, 179 Mich App 511, 515-16 (1989) aft’d 437 Mich 280 (1991). This reasonableness standard was part of the ALJ’s assessment of the standard for good cause attributable to the employer. This is evident by the ALJ’s statement that good cause would be found “where the employer’s actions would cause a reasonable, average, or otherwise qualified worker to give up his or her employment.” Carswell v Share House, Inc, 151 Mich App 392, 396-97 (1986) (quoting).

Digest author: Rita Samaan, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest updated: 10/31/2017


Martin v. E.C. Brooks Correctional Facility – 10.122

Martin v. E.C. Brooks Correctional Facility

Digest no. 10.122

Section 29(1)(a)

Cite as: Martin v EC Brooks Correctional Facility, Unpublished Opinion of the Court of Appeals of Michigan, Issued December 24, 2014 (Docket No. 316393).


Appeal Pending: No

Claimant: Cathy A. Martin

Employer: E.C. Brooks Correctional Facility

Docket no. 316393

Date of decision: Dec. 24, 2014

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Holding: Claimant is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because she failed to establish good cause for leaving her employment when she left in response to rumors of a layoff.

Facts: Claimant worked full-time at the E.C. Brooks Correctional Facility. Claimant left her employment because of uncertainty regarding her job status. Although claimant’s superiors informed her that she was going to be laid off, they subsequently told her that she was going to be transferred. The circuit court found that claimant was “uncertain” of whether she was going to be laid off.

Decision: The UIA determined that claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits. The ALJ disagreed, finding that claimant did qualify for benefits, because leaving in order to avoid a layoff amounted to leaving for good cause attributable to the employer. The MCAC reversed, finding that Claimant did not leave her employer in anticipation of a layoff, but rather, she left in anticipation of a “bump,” which was essentially a transfer. The circuit court affirmed the MCAC, following the same reasoning. The Court of Appeals of Michigan affirmed.

Rationale: The Court of Appeals of Michigan reasoned that Claimant did not satisfy her burden of showing that he leaving was justified because she left because of rumors and uncertainty.

Digest author: James C. Robinson

Digest updated: 3/15

War Memorial Hosp. v. Nodurft

War Memorial Hospital. v. Nodurft
Digest no.

Section 29(1)(a)

Cite as: War Mem’l Hosp v Nodurft, Unpublished Opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals, issued June 3, 2014 (Docket No. 312205)

Appeal Pending: No
Court: Court of Appeals of Michigan
Date of decision: June 3, 2014

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Holding: A nurses aide, discharged for refusing to help restrain an out of control patient and thus putting her co-workers and the patient in danger, commits disqualifying misconduct under MCL 421.29(1)(b).

Facts: Employer Behavioral Health Center terminated claimant Nodurft when claimant refused to assist, at the direction of nurse manager Greg Wolf, other staff members in the restraint of an agitated and violent patient. Defendant filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which the Unemployment Insurance Agency denied under the misconduct provisions of the Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA) MCL 421.29. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld the Agency’s decision, which the MCAC affirmed. Defendant then filed a claim of appeal with the circuit court, which reversed the MCAC’s decision upholding the denial of unemployment benefits.

Decision: The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s order overturning the decision of the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission, which upheld the denial of unemployment benefits to defendant Nodurft on the basis that she was “discharged for misconduct connected with her work,” under MCL 421.29(1)(b).

Rationale: The circuit court reversed the decision on the basis of its view that the evidence did not support plaintiff’s decision to terminate defendant’s employment on the basis of insubordination. Whether a termination is proper, however, is irrelevant when considering whether work-related misconduct occurred under MCL 421.29(1)(b). Nowhere in the Supreme Court’s definition of “misconduct” [in Carter v. Michigan Employment Security Comm.]  is the propriety of the employer’s authority to terminate an employee taken into consideration. Rather, the focus of the misconduct analysis must be on the claimant’s misconduct, not whether the employer wrongfully discharged the claimant. The CoA also found that the Circuit Court did not follow the correct standard of review.

When the definition of “misconduct” articulated by Carter is applied, it is clear that competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record supports the conclusion that disqualifying misconduct occurred.

Digest author: James C. Robinson
Digest updated: 2/15

Logan v. Manpower of Lansing, Inc.

Logan v. Manpower of Lansing, Inc.

Section 29(1)(a)

Cite as: Logan v Manpower of Lansing, Inc, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals of Michigan, Issued March 13, 2014 (Docket No. 311167).

Appeal Pending: No
Claimant: Janice Logan
Employer: Manpower of Lansing, Inc.
Docket no.: 311167
Date of decision: March 13, 2014

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Holding: The Court of Appeals held that claimant voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to the employer when she quit her employment at a temporary staffing agency to take part-time employment after being on medical leave.

Facts: Claimant began working for a temporary staffing agency, Manpower of Lansing, Inc. (“Manpower”) in April 2008. She was assigned to work part-time at Pennfield Animal Hospital (“Pennfield”). Claimant went on medical leave in August 2008. When claimant was ready to return to work in October 2008, she began working for Pennfield as a direct hire. The ALJ ruled that claimant was disqualified for benefits under MCL 421.29(1)(a) because “she abandoned her job with Manpower and took a part-time job with the client company.”

On appeal claimant asserted that she left Manpower to accept full-time work, which would implicate the exception in MCL 421.29(5) to the rule in MCL 421.29(1), which disqualifies a person from receiving benefits for voluntarily leaving work. On remand, the ALJ found that claimant quit her job with Manpower in order to accept permanent, part-time employment with Pennfield. The Calhoun Circuit Court affirmed.

Decision: The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on the Circuit Court.

Rationale: The Court of Appeals found that “the statute [MCL 421.29(1)(a)] does not refer to work that is unconnected to the employer; instead, the work is linked to a particular employer unit or employing unit, and when the relationship with that particular employer or employing unit ends, the work at issues necessarily also ends.”

Additionally, the court declined “claimant’s invitation to view a temporary-staffing firm and its client as a ‘joint employer’ or a single ‘employing unit,’” because claimant could not show “how Manpower was an agent (or employee) of Pennfield or vice versa.”

Digest author: James C. Robinson
Digest updated: 2/15

Cross v Tri-Fecta, Inc – 10.121

Cross v Tri-Fecta, Inc
Digest no. 10.121

Section 29(1)(a)

Cite as: Cross v Tri-Fecta, Inc, Genesee Circuit Court, No. 12-98465-AE (June 27, 2013).

Appeal pending:
Claimant: Michelle H. Cross
Employer: Tri-Fecta, Inc.
Docket no.: 12-98465-AE
Date of decision: June 27, 2013

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CIRCUIT COURT HOLDING: When a claimant holds a part-time job and full-time job simultaneously, then voluntarily quits the part time position only to subsequently be terminated from her full-time position in a qualifying manner is not disqualified from unemployment benefits due to the voluntary quit of the part-time job.

FACTS: Claimant held two jobs simultaneously: a full-time position at Quality Roofing, and a part-time job as a waitress at Employer Tri-Fecta, Inc. Claimant left her job with Employer on April 10, 2009, leaving her with only her full-time position at Quality Roofing. However, shortly thereafter, she was let go from that job as well in a qualifying manner. Claimant applied for benefits, and a UIA determination found in her favor.

Employer appealed Claimant’s benefits, and the ALJ found in Employer’s favor due to an erroneous interpretation of the facts believing that Employer Tri-Fecta. was Claimant’s last employer. On appeal, MCAC noted the mistaken facts but still found for Employer because of voluntary termination from Employer Tri-Fecta. Claimant appealed to the Circuit Court.

DECISION: The MCAC decision is reversed, and Claimant is entitled to unemployment benefits.

RATIONALE: The court’s reasoning in this case is short and unusual, and provided here in its entirety: “In this case the factual findings of the ALJ cannot be determined to be conclusive. They were clearly in error. The Court further finds that the MCAC decision is in error. The MCAC reviews the findings and decisions of the ALJ. The decisions of the ALJ are to be accorded deference. Who can tell what the decision of the ALJ would have been had the ALJ known the facts as they really were? The Court finds that the review process in this case is entirely flawed. This Court has not been made aware of any appellate decision in the State of Michigan that upholds the results before me. The Court further finds the rationale and reasoning of the Kent County Circuit Court case cited by claimant to be persuasive. ”

Digest Author: Jack Battaglia
Digest Updated: 8/14

Sheppard v Meijer Great Lakes Limited – 10.119

Sheppard v Meijer Great Lakes Limited
Digest no. 10.119

Section 29(1)(a)

Cite as: Sheppard v Meijer Great Lakes Limited, Unpublished Opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals, Issued Dec. 20, 2012 (Docket No. 300681).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Linda M. Sheppard
Employer: Meijer Great Lakes Limited
Docket no.: 10-000383-AE
Date of decision: December 20, 2012

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HOLDING: Claimant did not leave voluntarily for the purposes of Section 29(1)(a) when she attempted to take a leave of absence, failed to follow the correct procedures, and was subsequently discharged by the Employer.

FACTS: Claimant worked for Employer and attempted to take a two-month leave of absence. She notified her supervisor that she would be doing so, and her supervisor testified that he informed her that she would need written approval from the store director before she could take such a leave. There was a miscommunication regarding the approval, with both parties believing the other had obtained the necessary authorization. Claimant left without authorization and was subsequently terminated from her employment.

Claimant applied for and began receiving unemployment benefits. Employer protested her claim, arguing that Claimant had voluntarily resigned. The UIA issued a redetermination stating that Claimant was not qualified for benefits due to misconduct. On appeal, the ALJ affirmed the decision, stating that because Sheppard did not receive approval to take the leave of absence before she left work, she was not qualified because of misconduct. Claimant appealed to the Board of Review, which affirmed the ALJ on the grounds that she abandoned her employment, and was disqualified based on Section 29(1)(a), the voluntary leaving provision, not the misconduct provision. Sheppard appealed to the Circuit Court, which did not determine whether Sheppard abandoned her employment, but affirmed the Board of Review decision. Finally, Sheppard applied for leave to appeal, which was denied by the Court of Appeals but subsequently granted by the Michigan Supreme Court.

DECISION: The Circuit Court erred when it affirmed the Board of Review’s determination that Claimant voluntarily quit. The Circuit Court’s decision is vacated and Claimant is not disqualified from benefits.

RATIONALE: In determining whether a claimant is disqualified from benefits under 29(1)(a), the Court must first determine whether she voluntarily left her job, or was discharged. If it is found the claimant did not voluntarily quit, “the inquiry ends” and the claimant “is entitled to unemployment compensation.”

The Court of Appeals has previously held that “when an employee requests a leave of absence, and the employer actually terminates the employee’s employment, that employee has not voluntarily quit.” A voluntary quit must be an intentional act, but here, the act to end employment was conducted by the employer. Since there was no evidence that Claimant voluntarily quit or did not report for work on a day that Meijer expected her to work, the Circuit Court erred as a matter of law in upholding the Board of Review determination that Claimant voluntarily quit.

Digest author: Nick Phillips
Digest updated: 8/14

Myllylahti v. Full Force Diamond Drilling – 10.109

Myllylahti v. Full Force Diamond Drilling
Digest No. 10.109

Section 421.29(1)(a)

Cite as: Myllylahti v Full Force Diamond Drilling, unpublished opinion of the Ontonagon County Circuit Court, issued February 9, 2010 (Docket No. 09-71 AE).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Robert J. Myllylahti
Employer: Full Force Diamond Drilling USA, Inc.
Date of decision: February 9, 2010

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HOLDING: Where the working conditions imposed on a claimant by the employer are mentally and physically challenging enough to cause a reasonable, average or otherwise qualified worker to give up his employment, the claimant’s leaving was with good cause attributable to the employer.   

FACTS: Claimant began working for the employer on October 1, 2008 as a driller’s assistant working 13 hours per day, seven days per week. Claimant’s last day of work was October 22, 2008, when Claimant quit without prior notice to employer in the middle of his shift. Claimant indicated that the work was too hard and he could no longer do it. However, Claimant did not notify his employer of any work-related problems prior to quitting.

DECISION: The ALJ found that Claimant was disqualified for benefits. The MCAC affirmed. The Circuit Court reversed. Claimant is not disqualified for benefits.  

RATIONALE: To determine whether an employee left employment due to good cause attributable to the employer, the reasonable person standard is applied. “Under that standard, ‘good cause’ compelling an employee to terminate his or her employment should be found where the employer’s actions would cause a reasonable, average, or otherwise qualified worker to give up his or her employment.” Carswell v Share House, Inc, 151 Mich App 392, 396-397 (1986). The cumulative effect of 13 hours of heavy manual labor every day for twenty-two days straight, both mentally and physically, on a reasonable, average or otherwise qualified worker is born out by the record. Claimant’s physical inability to continue to do the job demanded of him by the employer, under working conditions imposed by the employer, would cause a reasonable, average or otherwise qualified worker to give up his employment, as well. This constitutes good cause attributable to the employer and not a personal reason attributable to claimant.

Digest author: Cydney Warburton, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest updated: 10/31/2017