Hodge v. US Security Associates, Inc. – 16.91

Hodge v. US Security Associates, Inc.
Digest No. 16.91

Section 421.29; Section 421.38

Cite as: Hodge v US Security Associates, Inc., unpublished opinion of the Mich. Sup. Ct., issued February 6, 2015 (Docket No. 149984).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Carnice Hodge
Employer: U.S. Security Associates, Inc.
Date of decision: February 6, 2015

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HOLDING: A reviewing court is not at liberty to substitute its own judgment for a decision of MCAC that is supported with substantial evidence.

FACTS: Claimant was a security guard at an airport. Claimant was fired for accessing publicly available flight departure information on a computer at the request of a traveler in violation of the employer’s policy regarding the unauthorized use of computer equipment. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disqualified claimant from unemployment benefits for committing misconduct under Section 421.29. The Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC) affirmed, holding that the decision was made in conformity with the facts as developed at the hearing and properly applied the law to the facts. The Wayne Circuit Court reversed, concluding that claimant’s conduct did not warrant a denial of benefits because claimant was violating the employer’s policy in order to help a customer, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the Wayne Circuit Court’s reversal.

DECISION: The Court of Appeals judgment is reversed and the MCAC judgment is reinstated.

RATIONALE: The Wayne Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals applied an incorrect standard of review by substituting their own assessment of the relative severity of claimant’s violation of her employer’s rules for the assessment of MCAC. A reviewing court is not at liberty to substitute its own judgment for a decision of MCAC that is supported with substantial evidence. A circuit court must affirm a decision of the ALJ and MCAC if it conforms to law and if competent, material, and substantial evidence supports it. The ALJ was the only adjudicator who actually heard testimony and observed the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, reviewed all the evidence in the record, and made findings of fact based on credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence. MCAC’s assessment of claimant’s conduct was made within the correct legal framework and was therefore authorized by law and not contrary to law, so the courts below improperly reweighed the evidence in order to reach a different assessment in violation of Section 421.38 and Const. 1963, art 6, § 28.

Digest author: Winnie Chen, Michigan Law, Class of 2017

Digest updated: 11/19/2017

Carter v. MLP MFG, Inc. – 16.75

Carter v. MLP MFG, Inc.
Digest No. 16.75

Section 421.38, Section 421.29

Cite as: Carter v MLP MFG, IncMuskegon Circuit Court, No. 02-41720-AE (February 18, 2003).
Appeal pending: No
Claimant: David Carter
Employer: MLP MFG, Inc.
Date of decision: February 18, 2003

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HOLDING: When both an agent and an attorney have filed an appearance, an order must be served to both of them to fulfill Section 421.1101 (now rescinded).

FACTS: The administrative law judge issued an opinion dated July 20, 2001, which affirmed an agency determination denying the claimant unemployment benefits because of misconduct. The claimant’s agent appealed this opinion. The Board of Review affirmed the decision with an opinion dated November 9, 2001. On December 10, 2001, the claimant’s counsel filed his appearance and a timely request for a rehearing of the November 9, 2001 decision. The Board issued an order denying the application for rehearing on January 24, 2002. This January 24, 2002 order was not sent to the claimant’s attorney. Consequently, on April 29, 2002, the claimant’s attorney moved the Board to reopen the matter so that the claimant could file a timely appeal with the circuit court. In an order dated June 28, 2002, the Board denied the application for reopening, but acknowledged sending a copy of the January 24, 2002 order to the claimant and the claimant’s agent, but not the claimant’s attorney. On July 2, 2002, the claimant filed this appeal to the circuit court.

DECISION: The Board of Review erred in failing to send the claimant’s counsel a copy of the January 24, 2002 order.  When both an agent and an attorney have filed an appearance, an order must be served to both of them to fulfill Section 421.1101 (now rescinded), which is to be read in a manner that does not produce an unjust result, even if the literal language of the rule suggests otherwise. Therefore the July 2, 2002 filing of this appeal was timely, and this Court will adjudicate the appeal on the merits. This Court finds that the ALJ’s decision was not contrary to law and therefore affirms the previous decision disqualifying the claimant for benefits.

RATIONALE: In construing administrative rules, courts apply principles of statutory construction. However, there is an exception “when a literal reading of the statutory language would produce an absurd and obviously unjust result and would be clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question.” AG v LS Wood Preserving, Inc, 199 Mich App 149, 155 (1993). Reading Section 421.1101(1) literally (“A decision, notice, or order shall be served on each party and on the agent or attorney of record of each party . . .” (emphasis added)) would provide an unjust result in this case, as the purpose and policy of the rule is to provide notice. Thus the Board of Review needed to send the January 24, 2002 order to both the claimant’s agent and the claimant’s counsel, even though the rule uses the word “or.” Hence, the 30-day appeal period of Section 421.38(1) was tolled until the Board of Review issued its final order on June 28, 2002, and the July 2, 2002 filing of appeal was timely. Nevertheless, this Court finds that the ALJ’s decision was not contrary to law and was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. The ALJ found the testimony of the cliamant’s supervisor to be credible. In doing so, he found that the claimant had engaged in three “no-call, no-show” absences which constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Section 421.29.

Digest author: Winne Chen, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest updated: 11/19/2017

Hurley Medical Center v. Thames – 16.77

Hurley Medical Center v. Thames
Digest No. 16.77

Section 421.38(1)

Cite as: Hurley Medical Center v Thames, unpublished opinion of the Genesee County Circuit Court, issued September 5, 2006 (Docket No. 06-84151-AE).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Kimberly Thames
Employer: Hurley Medical Center
Date of decision: September 5, 2006

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HOLDING: Under MCL 421.38(1), a reviewing court can only obtain jurisdiction over an appeal if the appeal is filed within 30 days of a lower court’s decision.

FACTS: On June 20, 2006, Appellant Hurley Medical Center filed an application for leave to appeal with the Genesee County Circuit Court. Appellee filed its answer on July 10, 2006. During their hearing, Appellee argued that Hurley’s appeal was filed outside the thirty day statutory appeal period required by MCL 421.38(1) and moved to dismiss Hurley’s leave to appeal. The Genesee County Circuit Court issued an order dismissing Hurley Medical Center’s application for leave to appeal on August 16, 2006. Hurley filed a motion to reconsider with the Court.

DECISION: The Court denied Hurley Medical Center’s motion for reconsideration because Hurley failed to show that the Court’s August 16, 2006 decision contained palpable error.

RATIONALE: MCL 421.38(1) requires a party to file an appeal within 30 days of a lower court’s decision. In Gunderson v Rose Hill Realty, 136 Mich App 559 (1984), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that MCL 421.38 is a jurisdictional statute. This means that a reviewing court can only obtain jurisdiction over an appeal if the appeal is filed within the 30 day period required by MCL 421.38(1).

The Genesee County Circuit Court denied Hurley’s application for leave on jurisdictional grounds on August 16, 2006 because the application for leave was filed beyond the thirty day period provided by MCL 421.38(1). In its motion for reconsideration, Hurley merely presented the same issues from its earlier application for leave and failed to demonstrate that the Court’s August 16, 2006 decision contained palpable error. For that reason, the Court denied Hurley’s motion for reconsideration.

Digest author: Sean Higgins, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest updated: 10/31/2017

Barbee v. J.C. Penney – 16.73

Barbee v. J.C. Penney
Digest No. 16.73

Section 421.29(b), 421.33, 421.34, 421.38

Cite as: Barbee v JC Penney Corp, Inc, Unpublished Opinion of the Circuit Court for the County of Oakland, Issued January 26, 2006 (Docket No. 177083W).

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Appeal Pending: No
Claimant: Della M. Barbee
Employer: J.C. Penney Corporation, Inc.
Tribunal: Circuit Court for the County of Oakland
Date of Decision: January 26, 2006

HOLDING: The State of Michigan Employment Security Board of Review’s (“Board”) lacks jurisdiction to review untimely appeals.

FACTS: Claimant was employed by J.C. Penney as a Customer Service Associate until she was discharged for misconduct. Her alleged misconduct included obtaining fraudulent refunds, discount abuse, and unauthorized price adjustments. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) disqualified the claimant from benefits due to her misconduct under MCL 421.29(b).

Claimant appealed the ALJ’s decision to the State of Michigan Employment Security Board of Review (“Board”). The deadline to appeal was September 24, 2004, but claimant did not file her appeal until October 6, 2004. Pursuant to MCL 421.33, the Board dismissed the late appeal due to lack of jurisdiction.

Claimant did not seek rehearing or to reopen the case with the Board for good cause but instead, appealed to the Circuit Court (“Court”) for de novo review of the Board’s (1) arbitrary Appeal deadline and (2) the underlying determination in finding the Plaintiff guilty of misconduct.

DECISION: The Board’s deadlines cannot be challenged as arbitrary because they were set by the legislature and codified as MCL 421.33(2) and MCL 421.34. Additionally, the Circuit Court cannot de novo review claimant’s underlying determination because she appealed the Board’s decision. Finally, the Board’s order dismissing claimant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction was proper.

RATIONALE: The Circuit Court ruled that the appeal deadlines were not arbitrary because they were established by the legislature through MCL 421.33(2) and MCL 421.34.

The Court also denied claimant’s appeal for de novo review of her underlying determination as guilty of misconduct. The Court noted that a claimant can appeal a referee’s (ALJ’s) decision to the Circuit Court directly under MCL 421.38(2). However, because the claimant appealed the Board’s decision and said decision did not include a review of claimant’s determination as guilty of misconduct, the Circuit Court lacks authority to de novo review the claimant’s guilty determination.

The Circuit Court reviewed the whole record to determine if claimant’s appeal was untimely. Pursuant to MCL 421.38(1), the standard for finding an appeal untimely is support by competent, material, and substantial evidence. After finding that the appeal was untimely under the standard, the Court affirmed the Board’s decision dismissing claimant’s untimely appeal for lack of jurisdiction under MCL 421.33.

Digest Author: Sean Higgins, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest Updated: 3/27/2016