Cross v Tri-Fecta, Inc – 10.121

Cross v Tri-Fecta, Inc
Digest no. 10.121

Section 29(1)(a)

Cite as: Cross v Tri-Fecta, Inc, Genesee Circuit Court, No. 12-98465-AE (June 27, 2013).

Appeal pending:
Claimant: Michelle H. Cross
Employer: Tri-Fecta, Inc.
Docket no.: 12-98465-AE
Date of decision: June 27, 2013

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CIRCUIT COURT HOLDING: When a claimant holds a part-time job and full-time job simultaneously, then voluntarily quits the part time position only to subsequently be terminated from her full-time position in a qualifying manner is not disqualified from unemployment benefits due to the voluntary quit of the part-time job.

FACTS: Claimant held two jobs simultaneously: a full-time position at Quality Roofing, and a part-time job as a waitress at Employer Tri-Fecta, Inc. Claimant left her job with Employer on April 10, 2009, leaving her with only her full-time position at Quality Roofing. However, shortly thereafter, she was let go from that job as well in a qualifying manner. Claimant applied for benefits, and a UIA determination found in her favor.

Employer appealed Claimant’s benefits, and the ALJ found in Employer’s favor due to an erroneous interpretation of the facts believing that Employer Tri-Fecta. was Claimant’s last employer. On appeal, MCAC noted the mistaken facts but still found for Employer because of voluntary termination from Employer Tri-Fecta. Claimant appealed to the Circuit Court.

DECISION: The MCAC decision is reversed, and Claimant is entitled to unemployment benefits.

RATIONALE: The court’s reasoning in this case is short and unusual, and provided here in its entirety: “In this case the factual findings of the ALJ cannot be determined to be conclusive. They were clearly in error. The Court further finds that the MCAC decision is in error. The MCAC reviews the findings and decisions of the ALJ. The decisions of the ALJ are to be accorded deference. Who can tell what the decision of the ALJ would have been had the ALJ known the facts as they really were? The Court finds that the review process in this case is entirely flawed. This Court has not been made aware of any appellate decision in the State of Michigan that upholds the results before me. The Court further finds the rationale and reasoning of the Kent County Circuit Court case cited by claimant to be persuasive. ”

Digest Author: Jack Battaglia
Digest Updated: 8/14

UIA v Varga – 19.12

UIA v Varga
Digest No. 19.12

19 USC § 2291(a)(5)

Cite as: Unemployment Insurance Agency v Redlin, unpublished opinion of the Jackson County Circuit Court, issued March 20, 2006 (Docket No. 182823).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant:  Peter Varga
Employer: N/A
Date of decision: March 20, 2006

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HOLDING: The application of agency by estoppel to the Agency is contrary to U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

FACTS: Claimant filed for Trade Readjustment Allowance (TRA) benefits. All claimants who file for benefits are referred to Michigan Works!, Michigan Works! is changed with processing both training authorizations and waivers. Here, Claimant acted on faulty advice of a Michigan Works! Employee and was determined to be ineligible for benefits by the Agency for non-compliance with 19 USC § 2291(a)(5). The Administrative Law Judge reversed the Agency’s determination and found the Claimant eligible for TRA benefits. The Michigan Employment Security Board of Review affirmed this decision on a theory of agency by estoppel. The Board of Review reasoned that since the Agency’s Fact Sheets refer claimants to Michigan Works! and since a claimant, with no knowledge of the “system”, should not be expected to know that an employee of the Agency “acted beyond the scope of his authority”, the ALJ properly found the employee was the Agency’s agent by estoppel.

DECISION: The holding of the Michigan Employment Security Board of Review is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Claimant is entitled to TRA benefits and the Board of Review’s application of estoppel to the Agency is reversed.

RATIONALE: The Board of Review reached the correct conclusion regarding eligibility for benefits but for the wrong reasons. Claimant received a waiver and therefore met the eligibility requirements of 19 USC § 2291(a)(5)(C) which does not contain the deadlines in 19 USC § 2291(a)(5)(A). As a result, Claimant is eligible for TRA benefits. However, the portion of the Board of Review’s reliance on the theory of estoppel was contrary to law as it is inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.  

Digest author: Cydney Warburton, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest updated: 11/19/2017

UIA v Redlin – 19.11

UIA v Redlin
Digest No. 19.11

19 USC § 2291(a)(5)

Cite as: Unemployment Insurance Agency v Redlin, unpublished opinion of the Lenawee County Circuit Court, issued January 11, 2006 (Docket No. 182123).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Matthew Redlin
Employer: N/A
Date of decision: January 11, 2006

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HOLDING: Agency was not established where a claimant relied on the faulty advice of a Michigan Works! employee who was acting beyond the scope of his authority, regarding filing for Trade Readjustment Allowance benefits.

FACTS: Claimant filed for Trade Readjustment Allowance (TRA) benefits. All claimants who file for benefits are referred to Michigan Works!, Michigan Works! is changed with processing both training authorizations and waivers. Here, Claimant acted on faulty advice of a Michigan Works! Employee and was determined to be ineligible for benefits by the Agency for non-compliance with 19 USC § 2291(a)(5). The Administrative Law Judge reversed the Agency’s determination and found the Claimant eligible for TRA benefits. The Michigan Employment Security Board of Review affirmed this decision on a theory of agency by estoppel. The Board of Review reasoned that since the Agency’s Fact Sheets refer claimants to Michigan Works! and since a claimant, with no knowledge of the “system”, should not be expected to know that an employee of the Agency “acted beyond the scope of his authority”, the ALJ properly found the employee was the Agency’s agent by estoppel.

DECISION: The holding of the Michigan Employment Security Board of Review is reversed. Claimant is not entitled to TRA benefits.

RATIONALE:  The Board of Review’s reliance on the theory of estoppel was contrary to law.

Digest author: Cydney Warburton, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest updated: 11/19/2017

 

Brown v LTV Aerospace Corp – 4.01

Brown v LTV Aerospace Corp
Digest no. 4.01

Section 48

Cite as: Brown v LTV Aerospace Corp, 394 Mich 702 (1975).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Russell W. Brown, et al.
Employer: LTV Aerospace Corporation
Docket no.: B70 773 38400
Date of decision: September 8, 1975

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SUPREME COURT HOLDING: (1) A pro-rata vacation allowance at the time of layoff is not a termination allowance and may be considered as vacation pay. (2) Where claimants are not numerous enough to require a class action, and their consolidated appeal is filed in a circuit other than Ingham, the appeal must be dismissed as to any claimant not residing in the circuit of filing.

FACTS: At the time of layoff, the claimants were paid a pro-rata share of their annual vacation pay. These payments were held to be remuneration under Section 48 of the Act. The claimants appealed to Macomb Circuit Court, where the appeal was dismissed as to claimant Boyer because he resided in Oakland County.

DECISION: (1) The pro-rata vacation pay was remuneration. (2) Boyer’s appeal was properly dismissed.

RATIONALE: (1) Analysis of the union contract ” … indicates that the agreement speaks of vacation pay to an employee regularly employed, of one ‘at the time of termination’ and one ‘terminated for lack of work and subsequently recalled’ in exactly the same way. The emphasis is all on guaranteeing vacation pay in accord with credit earned because of time worked. The system is integral and it is no different ‘at time of separation’ from either regular annual anniversary payments or payments of allowances for those terminated and then recalled.”

“The language of the statute is unambiguous, and it is clear that under [Section] 38 Boyer should have filed his appeal in either Oakland Circuit Court, the circuit court of the county in which he resided, or the Ingham Circuit Court.

Section 38 is a statutory grant of jurisdiction to certain circuit courts; if an appeal is improperly filed in the wrong court, that court has no option but to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.”

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated:
11/90