Ingham County v Joan M Cole & Story Oldsmobile – 11.04

Ingham County v Joan M Cole & Story Oldsmobile
Digest no. 11.04

Section 29(5)

Cite as: Ingham County v Joan M Cole & Story Oldsmobile, unpublished opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals, issued October 1, 1981 (Docket No. 55295).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Joan M. Cole
Employer: Ingham County & Story Oldsmobile
Docket no.: B78 03330 60690
Date of decision: October 1, 1981

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COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING: Claimant satisfied the leaving to accept provision of Section 29(5) even though she was on the payroll for 1/2 of a day and did not perform any work tasks. She did observe the work of others at the direction of the employer. Thus she “performed services” under the meaning of Section 29(5).

FACTS: Claimant left a bookkeeping position with Story Oldsmobile to accept a position with Ingham County. Although the position was considered to be temporary until a “posting” process was completed claimant was assured by the county clerk that the position was permanent. Claimant reported to work in the morning and remained until noon. At the direction of the person who hired her the claimant observed others work during that time but did not actually perform any tasks. She concluded the job involved secretarial duties rather than the bookkeeping responsibilities she had expected. She terminated her employment with the county and was paid for the partial day.

DECISION: Claimant is not subject to disqualification under Section 29(1)(a) for leaving Story Oldsmobile because she satisfied the leaving to accept provisions of Section 29(5).

RATIONALE: 1) Permanent nature of the work: Although the county personnel director considered the position to be a temporary one which had to be posted before it became permanent, claimant was led to believe by the person who hired her that she was hired for a permanent position and the posting requirement was only a formality. Under these facts the Board of Review’s decision the position was permanent is supported by the record, 2) Performance of services: Claimant observed the work of others but did not actually perform any specific tasks herself. This was done at the direction of the person who hired her. “Since Cole performed tasks at her work place in accordance with the instructions of her employer, we find that she performed services within the meaning of Subsection MCL 421.29(5). This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the county intended to pay Cole for the time she spent working … .”

Digest Author:  Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated: 11/90

Bradford v Shreve Steel Erection – 11.01

Bradford v Shreve Steel Erection
Digest no. 11.01

Section 29(5)

Cite as: Bradford v Shreve Steel Erection, unpublished opinion of the Michigan Employment Security Board of Review, issued March 23, 1978 (Docket No. B76 10199 RO 53944).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Bruce Bradford
Employer: Shreve Steel Erection
Docket no.: B76 10199 RO 53944
Date of decision: March 23, 1978

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BOARD OF REVIEW HOLDING: “The mere fact that the claimant worked only two days does not make inapplicable Section 29(5) of the Act.”

FACTS: The claimant voluntarily resigned to accept work with another employer. His successive employment lasted only two days, because he was laid off by his new employer.

DECISION: The claimant is not disqualified for voluntarily leaving.

RATIONALE: “When the claimant left Shreve Steel Erection, Inc., he did so for the purpose of accepting what he thought would be permanent full-time work with Michigan Boiler but for reasons unknown to the claimant, he was terminated from this employment after working only two days. The mere fact that the claimant worked ony two days does not make inapplicable Section 29(5) of the Act.

“The Board finds that the claimant left his employment with Shreve Steel Erection, Inc. to accept permanent full-time work with Michigan Boiler and the disqualification provision under Subsection 29(1)(a) of the Act is not applicable by virture of the provisions of Section 29(5) of the Act.”

Digest Author:  Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated: 11/90

Mikolaicziak v MESC – 7.07

Mikolaicziak v MESC
Digest no. 7.07

Section 28(1)(c)

Cite as: Mikolaicziak v MESC, 40 Mich App 61 (1972).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Leo J. Mikolaicziak, et al.
Employer: Twin Oaks Golf Club, Inc.
Docket no.: B69 573 37067
Date of decision: April 25, 1972

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COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING: (1) Unpaid service as a corporate officer is not employment. (2) A claimant need not be available for permanent work. (3) Weekly compensation for seasonal work is not an annual salary.

FACTS: Three claimants served as unpaid corporate officers of a golf course. Each owned one-third of the shares of the corporation. All performed manual labor and managerial duties, on a rotating basis, during the ten months of annual operation and maintenance. They were paid weekly for their work during the operating season. The claimants received no compensation in the two remaining months, but were available for temporary work then.

DECISION: The claimants are unemployed and available for work.

RATIONALE: “Since the claimants received absolutely no remuneration or compensation for serving as the corporate officers of the Twin Oaks Golf Club, they were not ’employed’ in such capacities within the meaning of Section 42(1) of the Michigan Employment Security Act. See Great Lakes Steel Corporation v Employment Security Commission, 381 Mich 249 (1968).”

“(R)emuneration was paid to them on a ‘weekly’ basis during the months that the golf course was open to the public.” The Act “. . . does not require an unemployed person to be available for and seek ‘permanent’ full-time work, but rather full-time work.”

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated:
11/90