Robinson v Young Men’s Christian Association – 11.03

Robinson v Young Men’s Christian Association
Digest no. 11.03

Sections 29(5), 40, 41

Cite as: Robinson v Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 123 Mich App 442 (1983).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: George Robinson
Employer: Young Men’s Christian Association
Docket no.: B76 18107 57053
Date of decision: February 24, 1983

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COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING: Section 29(5) does not apply if a claimant leaves to accept employment with an out of state employer not subject to the jurisdiction of the MESC.

FACTS: Claimant was employed at the YMCA, but resigned to accept permanent full time employment at the YMCA in Muncie, Indiana. He was discharged by the Indiana employer. Claimant returned to Michigan and applied for unemployment compensation.

DECISION: Claimant is disqualified from benefits.

RATIONALE: “In Merren v Employment Security Commission, 3 Mich App 383 (1966) a panel of this court held that the word ’employer’ in the phrase in question referred only to Michigan employers. This interpretation was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court, Merren v Employment Security Commission, 380 Mich 240 (1968).” “The term employer as used in the Act does not include out of state employers.

The Court of Appeals went on to say that Section 29(5) does not impinge upon Claimant’s right to interstate travel . . . and finds without merit Claimant’s argument that this construction of the statute renders it unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection of the laws.

Digest Author:  Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated: 11/90

Woodall Industries Inc. v. Tracy – 7.38

Woodall Industries Inc. v. Tracy
Digest No. 7.38

Section 421.28

Cite as: Woodall Industries Inc. v. Tracy, unpublished opinion of the Oakland County Circuit Court, issued Sept. 17, 1941 (Docket No. 26150).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Marie Tracy
Employer: Woodall Industries, Inc.
Date of decision: September 17, 1941

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HOLDING: The requirement that a claimant be “able to work and available for work” includes the ability to procure transportation to the workplace.

FACTS: Claimant lived twenty-two miles from her place of employment.  Claimant quit voluntarily because she lost access to transportation to the place of employment.  The Claimant re-acquired transportation approximately four months later.  Claimant was denied benefits for the period of time when she was without transportation.

DECISION: As a matter of fact and law, claimant was not “able to work and available to work” during the period when she had no means of transportation.  Claimant was eligible for benefits from the time when she re-acquired transportation that allowed her to travel to her place of employment.

RATIONALE: Eligibility for benefits depends on the ability to travel to the place of employment.*

Digest Author: James Mestichelli, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest Updated: 3/27/2016

*The court used 421.28(c), but that language seems to have been amended. That is why the statutory section cited above is just 421.28.